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I. Introduction
Our society is becoming more "computer-conscious" by the min-
ute. Whereas only a short time ago the computer was a monstrous,
expensive curiosity used behind the closed doors of major corporations,
today it is not uncommon for a family to own one or more. Computers
are no longer only for experienced professionals, as even children are
learning to manipulate them as tools for learning and playing.
Microcomputer sales will reach an estimated $15 billion by 1987, with
software sales increasing tenfold to $4.8 billion.1 In light of the awe-
some changes experienced by the computer industry in recent years, it
is not surprising that the legal aspects of computer trade are undergo-
ing an evolution of their own.
Behind every computer there is a "brain." This brain, or computer
program, is defined by the Copyright Act as "a set of statements or
instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to
bring about a certain result."' In the same way that human language is
capable of numerous combinations to express the same idea, the in-
structions given to a computer to bring about the desired result can
vary. In this sense, the embodiment of the idea in the form of a pro-
gram is creative expression. By the volume of programs on the market
today for home use alone, we see that the fruits of that creativity are in
demand. The ease with which programs can be copied has sparked an
1. Getting Tough on Software Theft, Bus. WK., May 31, 1982, at 28, 29. Some
terms with which the reader may not be familiar will be defined throughout this note.
Software is "[a] set of programs, procedures, rules and possibly associated documenta-
tion concerned with the operation of a data processing system." Data Processing is "the
execution of a systematic sequence of operations performed upon data." R. DORF,
COMPUTERS AND MAN 482, 471 (1977).
2. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. V 1981) (as amended by Act
of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10(a), 94 Stat. 3028). For a discussion of the
treatment of software under federal copyright law, see generally text accompanying
notes 11-87.
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active interest in the search for adequate insulation from piracy. Com-
puter clubs allegedly make hundreds of copies of programs for use by
their members.3 Persons claiming to be authors have sold infringed
copies of programs to unsuspecting software distributors who in turn
manufacture them for widespread sale. This illegal copying is costly for
original producers, some of whom estimate a loss of half their sales to
piracy.4 Accordingly, these computer programs, known as software,
constitute proprietary information that requires legal protection.
Legal protection for computer software is most visible in the form
of copyrights, trade secrets, and patents. The world is witnessing the
historical development of this area of intellectual property protection,
while a legal system that cautiously expands its limits grapples with an
exploding technology bound only by creative genius. Considering that
setting, this note will present the latest developments in the areas of
copyrights, trade secrets and patents as they relate to software
protection.
In particular, it will be shown how the latest court decisions have
construed recent legislation to conclude that a computer program's ma-
chine-readable object code5 is protectable by copyright law. In addi-
tion, the Copyright Office is seriously considering a change in deposit
requirements which would allow a computer program to be copyrighted
while remaining a trade secret.6 Regarding the application of patent
law to computer programs, the distinction drawn by the United States
Supreme Court between patentable processes and mathematical algo-
rithms is being questioned.7 It is intriguing that these various forms of
protection are each applicable, under certain circumstances, to com-
puter software. Article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution
empowers Congress "To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors, the ex-
clusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 8 As a re-
sult, exclusive rights were granted to authors for their writings through
the enactment of the Copyright Act,9 and to inventors for their discov-
3. Morgan, How Can We Stop Software Piracy?, BYTE, May 1981, at 6, 10.
4. Getting Tough on Software Theft, supra note 1, at 28.
5. See infra note 24.
6. See infra text accompanying note 114.
7. See generally text accompanying notes 135-56.
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
9. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (Supp. V 1981). See infra note 12 for the statutory
period of the exclusive right granted to authors.
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eries by the creation of the Patent Act.10 The unique character of a
computer program allows it to be considered as the written expression
of a programmer/author, or under the right circumstances as a new,
non-obvious invented process. Consequently, the software developer
needs guidance as to the best available protection for his work. This
note outlines the requirements for software protection under the laws of
copyrights, trade secrets and patents. In addition, it discusses how the
courts view computer programs as fitting into the scheme of intellectual
property protection.
II. Copyright Protection
A. Statutory Construction
In 1964, the Copyright Office announced its position that copy-
right registration for computer programs was permissible under the
Copyright Act.11 In order to meet the requirements for registration, the
program had to be the "writing of an author," the reproduction of
which had to be a "copy" acceptable for registration. Acknowledging
the inconclusiveness of these criteria, while upholding its policy of
resolving doubtful issues in favor of registration, the Copyright Office
presented the following guidelines which would place computer pro-
grams in a class with books:
(1) The elements of assembling, selecting, arranging, editing, and
literary expression that went into the compilation of the program
• . . [must be] sufficient to constitute original authorship.
(2) The program . . . [must have] been published, with the re-
quired copyright notice; that is, 'copies' (i.e., reproductions of the
program in a form perceptible or capable of being made percepti-
ble to the human eye) bearing the notice [must] have been distrib-
uted or made available to the public.
(3) The copies deposited for registration [must] consist of or in-
clude reproductions in a language intelligible to human beings. If
10. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (Supp. V 1981). An inventor is granted an exclusive
right over the use, manufacture, and sale of his invention for a period of 17 years. 35
U.S.C. § 154 (Supp. V 1981).
11. Copyright Registration for Computer Programs-Announcement from the
Copyright Office, 11 COPYRIGHT SOcIETY OF THE U.S.A. - BULLETIN 361 (1964). The
law in effect in 1964 was the original Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-32
(1964).
1983]
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the only publication was in a form that cannot be perceived visu-
ally or read, something more (e.g., a print-out of the entire pro-
gram) would also have to be deposited.12
The final words of the Copyright Office announcement indicated that
the procedure regarding computer programs would necessarily evolve
"over a period of time, on the basis of experience." 13
In 1976, a major revision of the Copyright Act was enacted with
an effective date of January 1, 1978.14 The new act eliminated com-
mon-law copyright, simplified procedure, and facilitated the curing of
"6mistakes" in publications without a copyright notice. Under the new
law, statutory copyright takes effect as soon as the writing is complete,
rather than when publication with notice occurs, as with the 1909
Act.1
3
Where a "copy" for registration purposes used to be "a written or
printed record of .. . [the work of authorship] in intelligible nota-
tion,""" the 1976 Act defines "copies" as
material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed
by any method now known or later developed, and from which the
work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, ei-
ther directly or with the aid of a machine or device. The term
'copies' includes the material object, other than a phonorecord, in
which the work is first fixed.1
12. Copyright Registration for Computer Programs, supra note 11, at 361. The
benefit received from securing registration is that a limited monopoly, through a grant
of exclusive rights, is obtained for a statutory period. (That statutory period is, in gen-
eral: life of the author plus 50 years; for joint works: life of the last surviving author
plus 50 years; anonymous/ pseudonymous/works for hire: 75 years from date of first
publication or 100 years from creation, whichever expires first. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1976).
For works created but not published or copyrighted before January 1, 1978 see 17
U.S.C. § 303.) The rationale behind the grant of an exclusive right is that the rents
obtained from it reward innovation and encourage innovators to create and market new
products. Stern, Present Copyright Law-Little Protection Against Unlicensed Use of
Proprietary Compilers, IEEE MICRO, Feb. 1983, at 67.
13. Copyright Registration for Computer Programs, supra note 11, at 361.
14. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 (1976). Sections 118, 304(b) and Chapter 8 took effect
Oct. 19, 1976.
15. P. HOFFMAN, THE SOFrWARE LEGAL BOOK II-B-I (1982).
16. This definition was used by the Supreme Court in White-Smith Music Pub-
lishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1,, 17 (1908) and adopted by the 1909 Copyright
Act.
17. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. V 1981) (emphasis added). Under section 101, "[a]
[Vol. 8
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This terminology also appears in section 102(a) of the Copyright Act, 8
which defines what works are subject to copyright protection.
To appreciate the potential effect of this language, it is important
to understand the phases that comprise a computer program.19 When a
problem is presented for a computer to solve, a flow chart,20 or sche-
matic diagram, is made, which indicates the logical steps involved in
solving the problem. This chart aids in the development of a source
program," written in one of the many source, or high-level languages2'
in which the programmer gives the computer instructions. These source
programs are readable by humans. They follow a specific syntax which
can be interpreted by a compiler, 23 which in turn translates the instruc-
tions into machine-readable code, otherwise known as the object pro-
work is 'fixed' . . . when its embodiment in a copy. . . is sufficiently permanent or
stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period
of more than transitory duration." Id. Thus, only the written or "fixed" expression of
an idea can be copyrighted, and not an idea itself.
18. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (Supp. V 1981).
19. A computer program is "[a] detailed set of instructions telling the computer
what types of input data it will receive, exactly what operations to perform on it and in
what order, and what type of output to produce." M. HARRIS, INTRODUCTION TO DATA
PROCESSING: A SELF-TEACHING GUIDE 300 (1979).
20. A flow chart is "[a] graphic representation of the definition, analysis, or solu-
tion of a problem, in which symbols are used to represent [such things as] operations,
data, flow, [and] equipment. . ." Dorf, supra note 1, at 473. In essence it is "a 'pic-
ture' of a computer program and how it is intended to operate." Harris, supra note 19,
at 298.
21. A source program is "[a] computer program written in a symbolic lan-
guage." Harris, supra note 19, at 300.
22. Examples of high-level languages are ALGOL (Algorithmic-Oriented Lan-
guage), APL (A Programming Language), BASIC (Beginner's All-purpose Symbolic
Interchange Code), COBOL (Common Business-Oriented Language), FORTRAN
(FORmula TRANslating System), PL/1 (Programming Language One), and RPG
(Report Program Generator). See generally Dorf, supra note 1, and Harris, supra note
19. There are a variety of types of languages in existence, such as algebraic manipula-
tion languages, associative languages, authoring languages, command and job control
languages, formal languages, list processing languages, macrolanguages,
metalanguages, nonprocedural languages, problem-oriented languages, procedure-ori-
ented languages, and string processing languages. For an explanation as to the function
of each, see A. RALSTON, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPUTER SCIENCE (1976).
23. A compiler is [a] program that "prepare[s] a machine language program
from a. . .[source] program by making use of the overall logic structure of the pro-
gram, [and/]or [by] generating more than one machine instruction for each symbolic
statement." Dorf, supra note 1, at 469.
19831
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gram. 4 Originally, communications with a computer were done by
manually entering the binary machine language.15 Today, through the
use of high-level languages, the process of translating to object code
occurs within the machine by way of the operating system26 in a com-
piler program. As a result, there is no longer a reason to program at
the machine-language level. Object code has thus been considered by
some courts to be unintelligible to--or not directed toward-humans,
and therefore cannot be protected by copyright under the 1909 Act.28
The words "with the aid of a machine or device" appear, at first
blush, to correct any deficiency in the 1909 Act with regard to object
code. The House Report 29 addressing this language expressed the inten-
tion that this language be read broadly, so as to "avoid the artificial
and largely unjustifiable distinctions, derived from cases such as White-
Smith Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.30 . . . under which statutory
copyrightability in certain cases has been made to depend upon the
form or medium in which the work is fixed." '
24. An object program is "[a] program in absolute machine language," which is
"the language that is understood by a computer; each statement has two parts: a stor-
age address and operation code." Harris, supra note 19, at 297 and 299. A simplified
diagram of the process described is as follows:
FLOW CHART ---- > SOURCE CODE ---- > COMPILER ---- > MACHINE CODE
readable converts standard l's & O's;
by people language into machine-
machine language dependent
for a specific
machine
While the advent of source programming is a tremendous advancement for computer
science, the qualities which make these programs adaptable to more than one computer
arguably facilitate software theft.
25. Binary code is "[a] code that makes use of exactly two distinct characters,
usually 0 and 1." Dorf, supra note 1, at 467. Machine language, or code, is "the lan-
guage understood by a computer." Harris, supra note 19, at 297.
26. An operating system is "[s]oftware which controls the execution of computer
programs and which may provide scheduling, debugging, input/output control, ac-
counting, compilation, storage assignment, data management and related services." Id.
at 478.
27. See supra note 24 and 25.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 43 and 57.
29. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5659.
30. 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
31. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 52, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5659, 5665.
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There was a problem, however, in applying the language of the
revised statute to object code. At the time of the Copyright Act revi-
sion in 1976, the legislature was not ready to make a definitive state-
ment regarding computer programs. As a result, section 11732 was
added to the Act, which required that no greater or lesser rights be
afforded to owners of copyrights on computer programs than existed on
December 31, 1977.33 This allowed the revision to pass "without com-
mitting Congress to a position on the computer-related issue until more
study could be undertaken." 4 Not affording owners of copyrights on
computer programs more rights was interpreted to mean that the 1909
definition of a "copy" 5 had to be applied. Since this required that the
"copy" be in a form intelligible to humans, machine-readable object
code was not a "copy" within the meaning of the Act.
Section 117 of the Copyright Act was completely altered in 1980
to allow for back-up copying for one's own software.38 However, if the
32. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1976), amended by 17 U.S.C. § 117 (Supp. V 1981). The
section, as it existed from 1978 until 1980, was entitled "Scope of exclusive rights: Use
in conjunction with computers and similar information systems." The text was an
follows:
[T]his title does not afford to the owner of copyright in a work any greater
or lesser rights with respect to the use of the work in conjunction with
automatic systems capable of storing, processing, retrieving, or transfer-
ring information, or in conjunction with any similar device, machine, or
process, than those afforded to works under the law, whether title 17 or the
common law or statutes of a State, in effect on December 31, 1977, as held
applicable and construed by a court in an action brought under this title.
Id.
33. Id.
34. FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL
USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 39, n.163 (1979) (the Commission is commonly re-
ferred to as CONTU).
35. See supra text accompanying note 16.
36. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (Supp. V 1981). The title of this amended section is "Limi-
tations on exclusive rights: Computer programs," and the text reads:
Notwithstanding the provisions of § 106, it is not an infringement for the
owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making
of another copy or adaptation of that computer program provided:
(1) that such a new copy of or adaptation is created as an
essential step in the utilization of the computer program in
conjunction with a machine and that it is used in no other
manner, or (2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archi-
val purposes only and that all archival copies are destroyed in
the event that continued possession of the computer program
should cease to be rightful.
19831
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alleged infringement occurred prior to January 1, 1978-the date the
1976 Act took effect-the courts applied the 1909 Act.
B. Judicial Application
While the statute raised many questions, most courts were willing
to find support for the copyrightability of software. One concern that
surfaced was whether input formats3 7 in computers were equivalent to
forms which communicate information, and which therefore could be
the subject of copyright. In Synercom Tech. v. University Computing
Co.,3' a federal district court decided that input formats are copyright-
able. The formats were distinguished from blank forms which do not
express ideas and are not a proper subject of copyright. 9 It was noted
that code books have been viewed as expressing ideas, thus receiving
the benefit of copyright protection.40 The court reasoned that the same
rationale could be applied to the input format. "The litmus seems to be
whether the material proffered for copyright undertakes to express. At
first glance these input formats are simply devices for the assistance of
the user to facilitate his task-forms. On reflection, however, one must
conclude that they indeed express ideas." '41
Any exact copies prepared in accordance with the provisions of this section
may be leased, sold, or otherwise transferred, along with the copy from
which such copies were prepared, only as part of the lease, sale, or other
transfer of all rights in the program. Adaptations so prepared may be
transferred only with the authorization of the copyright owner.
Id. Section 101 was also amended in 1980 by adding the definition of a "computer
program" as "a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a
computer in order to bring about a certain result." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. V 1981).
37. Id. An input-output routine is a "program which tells the computer how to
take the information which is put into the computer by an operator in one computer
language and translate that information into a more simplified "machine' language
which the computer can understand." Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc.,
524 F. Supp. 171, 173 (N.D. Cal. 1981). Most digital computers have five functional
components: 1) input; 2) storage of the input by memory; 3) a control unit which re-
ceives data from the memory and gives instructions for the arithmetic; 4) an arithmetic
which carries out the control's commands; 5) output capability. Synercom Tech. v.
University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1005 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
38. 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
39. Id., at 1011 (citing Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879)).
40. Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at 1011 (citing Reiss v. Nat'l Quotation Bureau,
Inc., 276 F. 717, 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1921)).
41. Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at 1011.
[Vol. 8
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A 1979 case subscribing to the "human intelligibility" '42 require-
ment is Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc.43 The court in
Data Cash ruled that the read-only memory (ROM)44 object code of
the plaintiff's program was not protected by copyright, even though the
source program was marked correctly. Copying the ROM was held not
to be actionable, since Judge Flaum determined that a program in
ROM does not constitute a true copy within the 1909 Copyright Act.
He determined that "[o]bject programs, which enter into the mechani-
cal process itself, cannot be read without the aid of special equipment
and cannot be understood by even the most highly trained
programmers. 45
Judge Flaum's determination was not entirely accurate. He was
compelled, by the existence of the original 17 U.S.C. § 117,46 to apply
the standards of the 1909 Copyright Act requiring human intelligibil-
ity. But according to a group of technical experts, object code can be
read by man:
Object code in binary form is often intelligible to skilled assembly-
or machine-language programmers. This is certainly true on an in-
struction-by-instruction basis. We feel that object code is no more
obscure in the U.S. than languages such as Arabic or Sanskrit. A
sequence of several thousand bytes of 8080 code, for example,
could be converted byte by byte to an assembly-language source
listing that could be protected by U.S. copyright
laws....
Object code does communicate in fixed messages to humans. Dupli-
cated object code will always be understood in the same way as the
original code by an individual who knows the machine code and the
computer instruction set to which it belongs. 47
42. See supra text accompanying note 16.
43. 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. I1. 1979).
44. Read-only memory is "a photochemically imprinted silicon chip which stores
information in the form of minute 'bits.' Bits are simply on-and-off switches. The pat-
tern, sequence and frequency with which these switches are activated gives (sic) in-
structions to the machine and causes (sic) it to function in its various modes." Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775, 778 (C.D. Cal. 1983). The
memory is permanently stored on the silicon chip and is, for all practical purposes,
immutable.
45. Data Cash, 480 F. Supp. at 1065.
46. See supra note 32.
47. Stern and Squires, Can We Stop Software Theft? IEEE, MICRO, Feb. 1982,
at 13, noting comments on memo submitted in response to the International Trade
1983]
9
Inofuentes: The Current State of Computer Software Protection: A Survey and B
Published by NSUWorks, 1983
Nova Law Journal
On appeal,48 the trial court's decision was affirmed on different
grounds. Because of this, and perhaps due to the difficulty in recon-
ciling the notion of "human intelligibility" with the 1976 Copyright
Act, Data Cash has not received much of a following in the courts.
However, it is an oft-cited case, mostly by alleged copyright infringers
in search of relief.
In Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc.49 the require-
ment of human readability was rejected by a California district court.
The court, following the 1976 Copyright Act, found a computer pro-
gram to be the required "work of authorship," while the silicon chip
served as the "tangible medium of expression." 50 The court seized the
opportunity to apply the language of 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) regarding the
fixing of words in media "from which they can be perceived. . . either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device."8 1 In support of the
court's application of this statutory language to the object code contro-
versy, legislative history was cited to clarify "the all-inclusive nature of
the definition of 'fixed' form:"
Under the bill it makes no difference what the form, manner or
medium of fixation may be-whether it is in words, numbers,
notes, sounds, pictures or any other graphic or symbolic indicia,
whether embodied in a physical object in written, printed, photo-
graphic, sculptural, punched, magnetic, or other stable form, and
whether it is capable of perception directly or by means of any
machine or device 'now known or later developed.' 2
The question of object code copyrightability was still not fully resolved.
The defendant, charged with copying a ROM chip, asserted that sec-
tion 117 required the court to determine whether it was a copy within
the meaning of the copyright laws by applying the law as it existed
before January 1, 1978. The court made it clear that to do so would be
Commission's request for public comment (46 Fed. Reg. 26,589 (1981)).
48. 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980). The judge hearing the case of Apple Com-
puter, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp. acknowledged that the district court's holding
in Data Cash was weakened (since it was affirmed on different grounds), and suggested
that the circuit court's affirmance may have revealed its belief that ROMs may be
copyright protected as long as copyright formalities have been satisfied.
49. 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
50. Id. at 173.
51. See supra text accompanying note 17.
52. Tandy, 524 F. Supp. at 173 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 52, reprinted in, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5665.)
[Vol. 8
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an incorrect application of the law:
It was not intended to provide a loophole by which someone could
duplicate a computer program fixed on a silicon chip. It did not
refer to the unauthorized duplication of a silicon chip upon which a
properly copyrighted computer program is imprinted. Such a du-
plication of a chip is not the use of a copyrighted program 'in con-
junction with' a computer; it is simply the copying of a chip. More-
over, any other interpretation would render the theoretical ability
to copyright computer programs virtually meaningless. 53
Less than one year after the Tandy decision, the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois specifically stated
that the ROM5 4 of plaintiff's videogame was protected by copyright. In
Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Intern, Inc.,55 the plaintiff's motion for a
preliminary injunction was granted. This prohibited Artic from distrib-
uting its videogame, the architecture for which had been structured
around an infringed copy of Midway's ROM chip. Initially, the deci-
sion would seem to overrule Data Cash, which was argued in the same
court. But where the rationale in Data Cash was based on application
of the 1909 Copyright Act, the Midway decision clearly centered on
the language found in the revised Copyright Act in conjunction with
the 1980 amendment. To further support the decision, district court
Judge Decker stated that "a work is no less a motion picture (or other
audio-visual work) because the images are embodied in a video tape,
video disc, or any other tangible form."'56
In July 1982, four months after the Midway decision, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania decided
the case of Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.57 Judge
Newcomer refused to issue a preliminary injunction sought by Apple to
restrain Franklin "from using, copying, selling, or infringing in any
other way Apple's registered copyrights on fourteen computer pro-
grams that are contained in or sold with the Apple II personal com-
53. 524 F. Supp. at 175 (emphasis in original).
54. See supra note 44.
55. 547 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
56. Id. at 1013 (quoting NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.09[D], in quote of Memo-
randum from the General Counsel of the Int'l Trade Comm'n to The Commission 7
(June 8, 1981).
57. 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
1983]
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puter. ' ' 58 Although no conclusion was reached on the copyrightability
question, Judge Newcomer's opinion on the preliminary injunction is-
sue expressed doubt as to the extent of protection afforded by the copy-
rights. In his opinion, Apple failed to show a reasonable probability of
success on the merits, or that it would suffer irreparable harm. On the
contrary, Judge Newcomer indicated that Apple's economic superiority
in the marketplace made it better suited to withstand the burden of
litigation. If Franklin were precluded from selling its major product
pending litigation, the consequences would be devastating.59
Judge Newcomer presented some interesting arguments for both
camps. In support of Apple's position, he noted that
[o]bject code may be said to be the language used by a program-
mer in the same way Hemingway may be said to have used English
to write For Whom the Bell Tolls. A ROM may be considered a
'tangible medium of expression,' fixing an original work much as a
book, record or motion picture film fix a literary work, a musical
work or a motion picture.60
In addition to the "tangible medium of expression," an "original work
of authorship" is needed to satisfy the requirements of copyright regis-
tration. But in the transition from flow chart to source program to ob-
ject code, major transformations take place in the structure of the pro-
gram. Judge Newcomer opined that it was not clear at which stage the
program author's design was in its original form, therefore qualifying
as a work of authorship.61 As noted earlier, programmers can commu-
nicate with a computer in object code. However, they no longer need to
do so since the computer is capable of making its own "translation"
from the source program. Apple thus argued that the "automatic trans-
lation of source to object code established a predictable one-to-one rela-
tionship between the two codes that preserved the programmer's origi-
nal force of authorship."6 "
The court introduced one issue discussed by the Commission on
New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU), the body
created by Congress to aid in the Copyright Act revision of 1976.3 The
58. Id. at 812.
59. Id. at 825.
60. Id. at 819-20 (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 820.
62. Id. at 822.
63. See generally CONTU's final report, supra note 34.
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contention was that object code embodied in a ROM is a mechanical
device and is therefore not copyrightable. This was not to suggest, how-
ever, that no protection should be available. Rather, a ROM may be
characterized as firmware, or a combination of software and hard-
ware64 that operate together to control a computer, which may, if other
aspects satisfy statutory criteria, be protectable under patent law.6 5
Judge Newcomer agreed that it is not illogical to treat object code
as an expression, but he added that "[i]f the concept of 'language'
means anything, it means an ability to create human interaction." He
submitted that a limit must be set in place. Otherwise, the court would
ultimately be providing "copyright protection to the programs created
by a computer to run other computers. With that, we step into the
world of Gulliver where horses are 'human' because they speak a lan-
guage that sounds remarkably like the ones humans use. It is an in-
triguing analogy but false." 6 Judge Newcomer's analysis is interesting,
but the code at issue is still the result of a human's creativity.
A mere three days after Franklin was decided, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled on Williams Electronics,
Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc.67 The Third Circuit, which is the same court
that would soon hear the Franklin appeal, upheld a permanent injunc-
tion enjoining Artic (the same Artic that was sued by Midway), from
infringing Williams Electronics' copyrighted program. Artic, relying on
Data Cash, unsuccessfully argued that ROM was not intelligible to
humans, and therefore not a proper subject for copyright. The Third
Circuit, however, relied on section 101 of the Copyright Act for their
decision:
By this broad language, Congress opted for an expansive interpre-
tation of the terms 'fixation' and 'copy' which encompass techno-
logical advances such as those represented by the electronic device
in this case. We reject any contention that this broad language
should nonetheless be interpreted in a manner which would se-
verely limit the copyrightability of computer programs which Con-
gress clearly intended to protect. We cannot accept defendant's
suggestion that would afford an unlimited loophole by which in-
64. Hardware is "[p]hysical equipment, as opposed to the program or method of
use; for example, mechanical, magnetic, electrical, or electronic devices." Dorf, supra
note 1, at 474.
65. Id. at 824. See generally text accompanying notes 135-56.
66. Id. at 825.
67. 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982).
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fringement of a computer program is limited to copying of the
computer program text but not to duolication of a computer
program fixed on a silicon chip."8
In the year following the Franklin and Williams decisions, com-
mentators have attempted to find some justification for the divergent
opinions. But in August 1983, the Third Circuit reversed the Franklin
district judge's refusal to grant a preliminary injunction to Apple. The
court of appeals declared that Apple's copyrights are indeed valid, de-
spite Franklin's argument that a "process," "system" or "method of
operation" cannot be copyrighted. The court predictably relied upon its
decision in Williams, thereby continuing the trend toward accepting
the copyrightability of operating systems and programs embodied in
ROM. 9
In February 1983, another district court was faced with the issue
of object code copyrightability. The court in Hubco Data Products
Corp. v. Management Assistance, Inc.70 determined that the certificate
of registration on copyrighted levels of the program served as prima
facie evidence of the validity of the copyright. However, a question still
remained as to the uncopyrighted levels. The court declared that Man-
agement Assistance had the burden of showing that their object code
was an "original work of authorship" under the Act, for which copy-
right registration is not required in order to benefit from protection.7
In response to defendant's argument that the code is used commonly
throughout the industry, it was determined that the originality required
here meant "independent creation," and not "novelty." In other words,
"a work is original and may command copyright protection even if it is
completely identical with a prior work provided it was not copied from
such prior work but is rather a product of the independent efforts of its
author.172
An argument similar to Franklin's 3 was asserted in a California
district court by Formula International in Apple Computer, Inc. v.
68. Id. at 877.
69. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir.
1983). See also Freiberger, Apple Has Ace in the Hole with ROM, INFOWORLD, Sept.
26, 1983, at 1; Gillen, Ruling Seen Definitive: Court Upholds Apple's ROM Copyright
Suit, COMPUTERWORLD, Sept. 12, 1983, at 5.
70. COPYRIGHT LAW DECISIONS (CCH) 18,100 (D. Idaho Feb. 3, 1983).
71. Id. at 18,104 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (1976)).
72. Hubco at 18,104.
73. See supra text accompanying note 57.
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Formula Int'l, Inc." Formula took the position that programs which
were integral to the operation of the machine, and which did not di-
rectly produce visual communication, were not copyrightable. Judge
Hill disposed of that argument by suggesting that there was no statu-
tory authority to sustain different treatments for functionally different
computer programs. 5 The opinion included an analysis of Franklin,
where Judge Hill submitted that Judge Newcomer misunderstood
CONTU's position. Judge Newcomer had cited CONTU's report on
the 1976 Copyright Act revision to support his determination that ob-
ject code is not copyrightable. In support of his conclusion, Judge Hill
stated that the Franklin decision was undermined by the Williams
case, since the Third Circuit, in Williams, took a point of view opposite
from that of the district court, in Franklin, only a few days later."6
Additionally, Judge Hill noted that Franklin did not present a clear
holding on the object-code question, and was decided under different
state injunction standards.77
Formula asserted that the grant of a preliminary injunction would
constitute an impediment to free competition. The court disagreed,
claiming that it would in fact be to Apple's advantage to have more
software available for owners of its computer. The defendant would
still be free to create compatible programs, but a byte by byte copy
would not be tolerated. The court stated:
Apple seeks here not to protect ideas (i.e., making the machine
perform particular functions) but rather to protect their particular
expressions of those ideas in the form of specific programs. And
Formula wants the privilege of using and marketing those expres-
sions without having to invest the millions of dollars and thousands
of manpower hours necessary to develop them. Simple economics
suggests that Formula's strategy would hinder, not promote, com-
petition and innovation in the computer market. Few companies
are going to invest the time and resources to develop new programs
if their products can be freely duplicated by anyone. Such 'compet-
itors,' who could undersell the originator simply because they don't
have its development costs, would destroy the market which any
innovator needs to recoup his investment.7 8
74. 562 F. Supp. 775 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
75. Id. at 780.
76. See supra text accompanying note 67.
77. Formula, 562 F. Supp. at 785.
78. Id. at 783.
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The court did not see this, however, as the final word in software
protection. In fact, Judge Hill submitted that copyright may not even
be the best form of protection for computer programs. He noted that
perhaps a hybrid or an entirely new form of protection would need to
be devised, but that the legislature, not the court, would be the proper
forum for such a determination. "To the extent [the court] is free to
express public policy, its choice is to place computer programs into an
existing category of legal protection as against affording them no pro-
tection at all."'7
C. Current Methodology and Considerations for the Future
The language in Formula adds credence to the indications that
there are strong policy justifications for protecting computer programs.
Apparently, there are a number of persons who agree, for efforts are
being made to enact a more comprehensive amendment to the Copy-
right Act as it relates to computer programs. "A Bill to Improve the
Protection Afforded to Computer Software" was introduced in August
1982 at the request of the Association of Data Processing Service Or-
ganizations (ADAPSO).80 The 1980 definition of "computer program"
would be revised, and definitions would be provided for "program
description," "supporting material," and "computer software." Section
102(a) of the Copyright Act, which gives a non-comprehensive list of
copyrightable subject matter, would be appended with "computer
software." Sections 401(b)(1) and 408(b), concerning the copyright
symbol (0) and registration, would be amended to accommodate pro-
grams. Section 301, on preemption with respect to other laws, would
resolve any conflicts which can arise through the combined used of
copyrights and trade secrets.81
79. Id.
80. Stern, Protecting Computer Software - The ADAPSO Bill, IEEE MICRO,
April 1983, at 58. The amended sections would be §§ 101, 102(a), 301, 401(b) and
408(b).
8 1. 'A computer program' means a set of instructions capable, when incor-
porated in a machine-readable medium, of causing a machine having in-
formation processing capabilities to indicate, perform, or achieve a particu-
lar function, task, or result .... A 'program description' means a
complete procedural representation in verbal, schematic, or other form, in
sufficient detail to determine a set of instructions constituting a corre-
sponding computer program. . . . 'Supporting material' means any mate-
rial, other than a computer program or a program description, created for
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An alternative has been suggested that would require compulsory
licensing for those distributing programs to the public for private use,
and stiffer penalties for known infringers. 2 Another recommendation
calls for an alternative form of protection altogether, that being a regu-
latory statute under the Commerce Clause which would render copying
of object code unfair as offending public policy. 3 On the other hand, it
is arguable that the available laws already provide adequate protection.
Considering the present state of copyright law, simple measures
can be taken to assure the best available protection. Each physical em-
bodiment of the software should be stamped with the copyright symbol
followed by the year the program was first distributed to the public.
Although copyright takes effect when the writing is completed, early
registration can make a difference in the amount of damages available
to a prevailing plaintiff in the event of a suit. Programmers can further
safeguard their work by imbedding "dummy" data into their programs
to aid in detecting an infringement;"" likewise, encrypting the code may
serve to deter a would-be infringer.
Copyrights are now the most common form of protection available
for software today, due to the ease with which registration can be se-
cured, as well as the reasonable $10.00 filing fee. Circular "R61," enti-
tled "Copyright Registration for Computer Programs," is readily avail-
able from the Copyright Office.85 The applicant is advised that
"[c]opyright protection extends to the literary or textual expression
contained in the opinion. Copyright protection is not available for
ideas, program logic, algorithms, systems, methods, concepts, or lay-
aiding the understanding or application of a computer program, for exam-
ple, problem descriptions and use instructions. 'Computer software' means
any or several of the literary works referred to in the definitions of com-
puter program, program description, and supporting material. Stern, supra
note 80, at 59.
82. Note, Software Piracy and the Personal Computer: Is the 1980 Software
Copyright Act Effective? 4 COMPUTER/LAw J. 171 (1983).
83. Stern, Can We Stop Software Theft?, supra note 13.
84. Brown, Software Protection Battle Rages On, ELECTRONICS, Nov. 17, 1982,
at 24. Dummy data is information imbedded into a program which is not essential to
the program's successful performance. Its appearance in a suspect program aids in
proving the likelihood of an infringement.
85. U.S. Government Printing Office: 1983-381-279:572. Forms can be obtained
by writing to Information and Publications Section, LM-455, Copyright Office, Library
of Congress, Washington, D.C. 20559, or by calling the Forms Hotline on (202)287-
9100.
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outs." ' It also includes the definition of a computer program, deposit
requirements and instructions on placing the copyright notice, both for
visually perceptible copies and works reproduced in machine-readable
copies. While source programs are recommended for deposit, it is noted
that "registration will proceed under our RULE OF DOUBT policy
upon receipt of written assurance from the applicant that the work as
deposited in object code contains copyrightable authorship. '87
Since the 1964 announcement by the Copyright Office, copyright
registration for computer software has metamorphosed from a mere po-
sition taken on validity to a relatively well-defined procedure backed by
legislation and case law. While more changes will surely be seen in the
near future, copyrighting can be expected to remain an important force
to be considered when evaluating the alternatives in legal protection for
software.
III. Trade Secret Protection
A. The Basis for Trade Secret Protection
There are programs that do not meet the statutory requirements
for patents, or whose authors wish to protect their idea so as to market
it while a patent application is pending. There are others who desire to
protect their very ideas, and not only the embodiment of those ideas,
rendering copyright protection insufficient. For these purposes, trade
secret protection serves a useful function. Unlike patents and copy-
rights, trade secrecy is a state doctrine. In many states it exists only
through common law,88 and arises from taking precautions to keep
one's idea or methodology a secret. It is commonly secured through
contractual arrangements, with the owner putting the user on notice
that the information being transferred is not to be disclosed, except as
may be authorized. Trade secrecy offers a broad scope of protection
which covers the concept and the expression, it protects against disclos-
ure, and continues in effect until the idea enters the public domain.89
86. Id.
87. Form TX, for published and unpublished nondramatic literary works, is the
correct form to be filed for the registration of computer programs. U.S. Government
Printing Office: 1983:381-278/101.
88. See infra text accompanying note 94.
89. The information need not be "generally known to the public for trade secret
rights to be lost," but may be known within the industry, or available to the public in
print. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS Acv § I comment 5, 14 U.L.A. 537, 541 (1980).
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"Trade secret" is characterized by the Restatement of Torts:
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or com-
pilation of information which is used in one's business, and which
gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors
who do not know or use it. It may be a formula for a chemical
compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving
materials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of
customers.9
This definition has been employed by courts in their discussion of trade
secret protection for software,91 as well as by the United States Su-
preme Court in cases regarding the validity of a proclaimed trade se-
cret. 2 The official comment to the Restatement of Torts acknowledges
that there exists no exact definition of "trade secret," but provides fac-
tors which help determine whether a trade secret has been established
by the product owner. Those factors are:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of his
business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and
others involved in his business; (3) the extent of measures taken by
him to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the
information to him and to his competitors; (5) the amount of effort
or money expended by him in developing the information; (6) the
ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly ac-
90. RESTATEMENT OF TORT § 757 comment b (1939). The text of section 757
reads:
One who discloses or uses another's trade secret, without a privilege to do
so, is liable to the other if
(a) he discovered the secret by improper means, or
(b) his disclosure or use constitutes a breach of confidence re-
posed in him by the other in disclosing the secret to him, or
(c) he learned the secret from a third person with notice of
the facts that it was a secret and that the third person discov-
ered it by improper means or that the third person's disclosure
of it was otherwise a breach of his duty to the other, or
(d) he learned the secret with notice of the facts that it was a
secret and that its disclosure was made to him by mistake.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939).
91. See, e.g., Videotronics, Inc. v. Bend Electronics, 564 F. Supp. 1471 (D. Nev.
1983) (see infra text accompanying note 128), and J & K Computer Systems, Inc. v,
Parrish, 642 P.2d 732, 735. (Utah 1982) (see infra text accompanying note 98).
92. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979); Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
1983]
19
Inofuentes: The Current State of Computer Software Protection: A Survey and B
Published by NSUWorks, 1983
Nova Law Journal
quired or duplicated by others."
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act was approved in 1979 by the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,94 but as
of 1983 it had only been adopted in Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Min-
nesota and Washington." The act more broadly defines trade secrets as
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program,
device, method, technique, or process, that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or poten-
tial, from not being generally known to, and not being
readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons
who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or
use, and (ii) is the subject of the efforts that are reason-
able under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy."
Applying either definition, it is clear that computer programs do
constitute trade secret subject matter.97 Recent case law confirms this,
while attempting to identify the extent of protection offered to trade
secret owners.
B. Case Law
In J & K Computer Systems, Inc. v. Parrish," J & K sued its
former employees and their corporation, alleging wrongful appropria-
tion of proprietary information. Parrish had made an electronic copy of
a program he developed while an employee of J & K, and continued to
use it, in defiance of his employment contract, after he left the coin-
93. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939). These criteria were noted
by the court in M. Bryce & Associates, Inc. v. Gladstone, 107 Wis. 2d 241, 319
N.W.2d 907 (1982). See infra text accompanying note 102. The Restatement Second
of Torts (1978) did not incorporate section 757, but the language of the first Restate-
ment is still controlling, as is evident in the cases cited supra notes 91 and 93.
94. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS AcT § 1, 14 U.L.A. 537, 539 (1980). The Act was
proposed by a special committee pursuant to recommendations by the Patent Law Sec-
tion of the American Bar Association. The committee's work was done in conjunction
with the Antitrust, Banking and Business, Corporation, and Patent Law sections of the
American Bar Association. Id. at 538-39.
95. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 206 (Supp. 1983).
96. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 537, 542 (1980).
97. For a discussion of trade secrets and computer programs, see Bender, Trade
Secret Protection of Software, 38 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 909 (1969).
98. 642 P.2d 732 (Utah 1982).
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pany. Parrish asserted that the program was not confidential so as to
constitute a trade secret. The Utah Supreme Court, however, disagreed
with Parrish's assertion, noting that the program was unique in that it
could not be found in any text or source book.99 This established the
requirement that the information sought to be protected not be known
throughout the industry.100 Parrish further argued that the program
had been revealed to certain customers and could not therefore be
deemed secret. This argument was rejected by the court, since J & K
had taken steps to inform employees and customers of the secret nature
of programs they had been authorized to use. In addition, the programs
themselves were marked as being proprietary to J & K, and usable by
license agreement only. "That a few of the plaintiff's customers had
access to the program does not prevent the program from being classi-
fied as a trade secret where the plaintiff was attempting to keep the
secret and the program is still unavailable to the computer trade as a
whole."101
In the 1982 case of M. Bryce & Associates, Inc. v. Gladstone,10 2 a
non-disclosure agreement was signed by persons attending a demon-
stration of M. Bryce's management information system. Though no
sale resulted from the demonstration, the persons to whom the system
was shown used the information disclosed to reproduce the system. In
the suit that followed, the defendant asserted that there had been no
misappropriation since the product he issued was not an exact duplicate
of plaintiff's system. The court disagreed, noting the trial court's in-
struction to the jury, adopted from the Restatement of Torts, as to a
"use" of a trade secret:
To subject a person to liability for use of another's trade se-
cret, there is no requirement that he use it exactly in the form that
he received it. He may be liable even if [he] uses it with modifica-
tion-modifications or improvements upon it affected by his own
efforts.
Differences in detail do not preclude liability if substantially
the process used by the actor is derived from the other's secret in
breach of a relationship of trust and confidence.
The liability is avoided only when the contribution by the
other's secret is so slight that the actor's process can be said to be
99. Id. at 735.
100. See supra note 89.
101. J & K Computer Systems, 642 P.2d at 735.
102. 107 Wis. 2d 241, 319 N.W.2d 907 (1982).
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derived from other sources.103
The defendant also argued that since information pertaining to the sys-
tem had been offered to the public in advertisements, trade-secret sta-
tus was lost. The court noted, however, that the advertisement showed
the reader "what" the product was, and not "how" it was put
together.1 '"
For many companies, policy regarding employee conduct may be
the only way to keep information secure. In March 1983, the district
court of Hawaii upheld Honeywell Information Systems' firing of two
employees who formed a computer company while working for Honey-
well.10 5 The dismissed employees argued that their business did not
compete with Honeywell's market, since Honeywell did not sell a cer-
tain type of computer in Hawaii.106 The court's response was that di-
rect competition was not necessary for a finding of conflict:
Honeywell is undoubtedly in possession of valuable trade secrets,
such as software programs, marketing techniques, market studies,
and other valuable information developed perhaps at great cost to
the company. The employment policy here seems to be a reasona-
ble means to prevent the improper and unauthorized use of such
information by persons or businesses which may unjustly benefit
themselves with such information.1
0 7
Company policies are frequently embodied in a written contract
between the employer and the employee. In this manner, the employee
is on notice that information learned as an employee is to be main-
tained in confidence. International Business Machines Corp., for exam-
ple, requires newly-hired employees to sign an "Agreement Regarding
Confidential Information and Intellectual Property."108 The agreement
forbids disclosure of confidential information during and after their
employment; the employee assigns to the corporation his
103. Id. at 252, 319 N.W. 2d at 912. The trial court's instructions to the jury
came from RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment c (1939).
104. 107 Wis. 2d at 250, 319 N.W.2d at 911.
105. Moore v. Honewell Information Systems, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 1229 (D. Ha-
waii 1983).
106. Id. at 1233.
107. Id.
108. IBM form, "Agreement Regarding Confidential Information and Intellec-
tual Property" (Rev. 6/80).
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entire right, title and interest in any idea, invention, design of a
useful article (whether the design is ornamental or otherwise),
computer program and related documentation, and other work or
authorship. . . conceived. . . or written wholly or in part by...
[the employee], whether or not such . . . [works] are patentable,
copyrightable or susceptible to other forms of protection ...
[which are] created within the scope of. . . [his] employment.109
Trade secrets have proven effective for a wide variety of products,
such as soft drink formulae, and the process of manufacturing orches-
tral cymbals. 110 Once proper precautions have been taken to guard the
trade secret, products of this nature are put on the market for wide-
spread distribution. Other manufacturers attempt to imitate successful
products. But as long as the producer has taken steps to prevent dis-
closure, the actual process involved in making the original product will
remain a secret. When computer programs are marketed by licensing
them to individual users, the contractual agreement protects the owner
in case of infringement. However, it is impractical to have that type of
arrangement when widespread distribution is desired. The software
manufacturer can distribute his system ,while taking steps to keep his
methodology secret, such as limiting knowledge of the process involved
to his employees. Unlike many other products, however, computer ap-
plications may not receive adequate protection from trade secrecy, due
to the scope of protection afforded. Trade secret status guards against
discovery by "improper means." 11 "Improper means" does not include
independent development or reverse engineering. Reverse engineering is
"a technique by which the product of a secret formula or process is
analyzed, first to retrace the steps essential to its creation and then to
recreate the formula or process itself.1112 In the case of many computer
programs, reverse engineering may not be difficult. The result may be a
109. Id.
110. One process for manufacturing cymbals has been maintained a family se-
cret for hundreds of years. J. POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS: HOW TO PROTECT YOUR
IDEAS AND AssETS 18-19 (1982). Other examples noted are such divergent things as
"[a] process for extracting alcohol from empty whiskey barrels .... [t]he seminar
technique of a group nonsmoking clinic .... [d]esigns for automatic toll collection
equipment [and] [e]mployee benefit information." Id. at 19. In effect, anything main-
tained secret which can comply with the requirements set forth in the Restatement (see
supra text accompanying notes 90 and 93), qualifies for trade secret protection.
111. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939).
112. P. GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE
DOCTRINES 157 (1981).
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loss of one's proprietary information:
This freedom to create or recreate independently means that any
number of unrelated firms within a particular industry may eventu-
ally come to possess a single trade secret. Once this possession be-
comes general, and the information becomes widely known in the
industry, the secrecy requisite is no longer met and, under the rule
usually followed, even those to whom the secret was imparted in
confidence may use the information freely.113
C. Current Problems: Trade Secrets on Copyrighted Computer
Programs
The issue today is not whether computer programs can receive
trade secret protection, but rather whether trade secret protection can
be used in conjunction with federal grants of exclusive rights on intel-
lectual property. There is a problem inherent in copyrighting a pro-
gram while maintaining that it constitutes a trade secret. Though the
Copyright Act no longer requires immediate registration, once a copy
of the program is furnished to the Copyright Office it is a matter of
public record. This is obviously inconsistent with the basic requirement
of secrecy with trade secrets. Yet, many program owners are treating
programs as trade secrets while affixing the copyright symbol to their
work. It is an attempt to secure protection for both the expression and
the idea, and to have copyright protection available as a backup should
secrecy be lost. 114
Court decisions reflect the confusion that exists with the attempt
to combine trade secrets with copyrights. In 1974, the Supreme Court
determined that patentable inventions could be protected by state trade
secret doctrines, since federal intellectual property law does not pre-
empt state trade secret protection. 11 5 "The only limitation on the States
is that in regulating the area of patents and copyrights they do not
113. Id. at 157-158. There may be a problem of proof involved in determining
whether a program has been independently created, analyzed and recreated, or simply
unfairly acquired. For a discussion on how to recognize a copy, see Dakin and Higgins,
Fingerprinting a Program, DATAMATION, April 1982, at 133.
114. See generally Lucarelli, Jr., The Supremacy of Federal Copyright Law
over State Trade Secret Law for Copyrightable Computer Programs Marked with a
Copyright Notice, 3 COMPUTER/LAW J. 19 (1981).
115. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 470.
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conflict with the operation of the laws in this area passed by
Congress .... 11
Courts have seized on this language to hold both ways. In
Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co.,117 the federal
district court refused to grant relief on a state theory of unfair competi-
tion for the use of computer input formats and instruction manuals.
Since relief had already been granted for copyright infringement, the
court expressed its belief that enforcement of the state doctrine would
significantly interfere with federal policy. The court thus declared the
state misappropriation doctrine preempted by federal patent and copy-
right laws." 8 Two years later, a district court in Texas took the oppo-
site view in deciding Warrington Assoc. v. Real-Time Eng. Systems.' 9
The court found that Warrington Associates' common-law trade secret
claim was not preempted by the federal Copyright Act, and thus de-
nied Real-Time's motion for summary judgment. While noting that
copyright disclosure could "strip the underlying idea of its confidential-
ity, and thus its status as a trade secret,"1 20 the court acknowledged
that the two could be interactive. In addition, "the trade secrets tort is
premised on concepts of breach of trust and confidentiality, and not
copying, ' 121 therefore not compelling preemption.
In Technicon Med. Info. v. Green Bay Packaging,2 2 the Seventh
Circuit likewise refused to find a conflict between the federal and state
laws. In a user's manual for Technicon's computer software, a legend
was included, noting that the disclosed information was proprietary
"and shall not be duplicated, used or disclosed, in whole or in part,
except with the expressed permission of the owner."' 3 In addition, a
copyright symbol was affixed. The defendant argued that the symbol
represented publication, which negated the existence of a trade secret.
Technicon's claim was that there was no publication, 24 and that the
116. Id. at 479.
117. 474 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
118. Id. at 44.
119. 522 F. Supp. 367 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
120. Id. at 368.
121. Id. at 369.
122. 687 F.2d 1032 (7th Cir. 1982) (cert. denied) - U.S. _, 103 S. Ct.
732 (1983).
123. Id. at 1033 n.1.
124. The court quoted 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 4.04 (1981) to note the dif-
ference between the two types of publication:
A general publication 'occurs when by consent of the copyright owner the
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symbol was "included for protection in the event that an inadvertent
publication occurred." 12 5 The court agreed with Technicon's argument,
and declared that affixing the copyright notice as a deterrent consti-
tuted correct usage of the symbol. It was further noted that advancing
alternative theories-i.e., copyright or trade secret-was permissible
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."' Enforcement of both,
however, could present a conflict.1 27
That the law in this area is far from settled is further evidenced in
an opinion issued by the United States District Court for the District of
Nevada.1 28 In what seems to be a reversal of the trend away from pre-
emption since Synercom,12 9 the court found that federal copyright law
preempted the application of the state common-law doctrines of misap-
propriation and trade secrecy. The court acknowledged that evidence
clearly established that the defendant copied the plaintiff's video
game,130 which included software. Despite this, the plaintiff could not
avail itself of state doctrines since the programs involved were eligible
for copyright protection.
Apparently, the desire to take advantage of both trade secret and
copyright protection on computer programs is widespread. Many copy-
right owners, especially authors of computer programs, have requested
that the Copyright Office consider special deposit provisions for works
containing trade secrets.131 The Copyright Office normally requires that
original or tangible copies of a work are sold, leased, loaned, given away or
otherwise made available to the general public, or when an authorized of-
fer is made to dispose of the work in any such manner if a sale or other
such disposition does not, in fact, occur.'
Id. at 1035. This was contrasted with the definition of a limited publication, found in
White v. Kimmel, 193 F.2d 744 (9th Cir.) cert. denied 343 U.S. 957 (1952). "'A
limited publication [is one] which communicates the contents of a manuscript to a
definitely selected group and for a limited purpose, and without the right of diffusion,
reproduction, distribution or sale ... '" Technicon, 687 F.2d at 1035 (quoting Data
Cash, 628 F.2d at 1042).
125. Technicon, 687 F.2d at 1034.
126. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2).
127. Technicon, 687 F.2d at 1038.
128. Videotronics, Inc. v. Bend Electronics, 564 F. Supp. 1471 (D. Nev. 1983).
129. See supra text accompanying note 114.
130. Videotronics, 564 F. Supp. at 1473.
131. Notice of Inquiry Deposit of Computer Programs and Other Works Con-
taining Trade Secrets, 48 Fed. Reg. 22,951 (1983), reprinted in New Developments:
Comments Requested on Deposits Containing Trade Secrets, 11 COPYRIGHT LAW RE-
PORTS (CCH) 20,229 (1983).
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two copies of the work be submitted for registration. The deposit then
becomes a matter of public record, which would destroy any trade se-
cret that might be included. In response to the concerns expressed, the
Copyright Office published a request for comments in May 1983.132
The request notes in its section on policy considerations that many ap-
plicants have requested the same treatment that secure tests 38 receive.
In such instances, one complete copy is received as a deposit instead of
two. After examination the copy is returned to the applicant, the Copy-
right Office retaining some portion or description to serve as a record of
deposit.' In this manner trade secret status would not be nullified by
virtue of a copy being made available for public viewing through de-
posit with the Copyright Office. Alternative deposit suggestions for
computer programs containing trade secrets have been solicited, and in
particular, answers have been requested to twelve detailed questions.
The notice makes it clear that the policy decisions the Office intends to
formulate, with the aid of responses received, will shape the future of
copyright registration.
IV. Patent Protection
Patent protection offers the software producer a combination of
the most attractive features of copyright and trade secret security. In
addition to being protected against copying and disclosure, the patent
holder is shielded from independent creation and reverse engineering.'"
The federal government's power to grant a patent is derived from
article I of the United States Constitution. 86 The benefit conferred
upon the patent owner is the legal right "to exclude others from mak-
ing, using, and selling an invention" for a period of 17 years. 37 This
132. Id. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 202.20 (1982) for deposit requirements.
133. A secure test is a "nonmarketed test administered under supervision and
specified centers on specific dates, all copies of which are accounted for and either
destroyed or returned to restricted locked storage following each administration." 37
C.F.R. § 202.20(b)(4) (1982)).
134. 48 Fed. Reg. 22,951, 22,952 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(c)(vi) (1982)).
135. See supra text accompanying note 112.
136. "The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. As
explained in the text accompanying note 8, supra, the power to grant copyrights is also
derived from this clause.
137. Blumenthal, Lifeforms, Computer Programs, and the Pursuit of a Patent,
1983]
27
Inofuentes: The Current State of Computer Software Protection: A Survey and B
Published by NSUWorks, 1983
Nova Law Journal
statutory period of protection encourages inventors of patentable sub-
ject matter to disclose their work, since they need not fear infringe-
ment.13 8 It would appear, then, that patent protection is the ideal route
to computer program protection. However, due to the great degree of
protection offered, the requirements for patent eligibility are strin-
gent.139 To meet the requirements, it must first be determined whether
the program sought to be patented constitutes patentable subject mat-
ter. To do so, the item must be a "new and useful process,140 machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improve-
ment thereof. 1 411 Further conditions are that the subject matter, once
established as patentable, be novel1 42 and non-obvious. 43
The issue of patentability of computer programs has already
reached the United States Supreme Court.144 The programs in question
86 TECH. REV., Feb./Mar. 1983, at 26, 29.
138. [A] patent system provides an incentive to invent by offering the pos-
sibility of reward to the inventor and to those who support him. This pros-
pect encourages the expenditure of time and private risk capital in re-
search and development efforts.
[A] patent system stimulates the investment of additional capital needed for
further development and marketing of the invention. In return, the patent
owner is given the right, for a limited period, to exclude others from mak-
ing, using or selling the invented product or process.
[B]y affording protection, a patent system encourages early public disclo-
sures of technological information, some of which might otherwise be kept
secret. Early disclosure reduces the likelihood of duplication of effort by
others and provides a basis for further advances in the technology involved.
[A] patent system promotes the beneficial exchange of products, services,
and technological information across national boundaries by providing pro-
tection for industrial property of foreign nationals.
Goldstein, supra notes 15-16 (quoting REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON
THE PATENT SYSTEM 1-3 (1966)).
139. These requirements are outlined in the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-104
(Supp. V 1981).
140. The word "process" is defined as a "process, art or method, and includes a
new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or mate-
rial." 35 U.S.C. § 100 (1976).
141. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. V 1981).
142. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (Supp. V 1981).
143. A patent may not be obtained.. . if the differences between he sub-
ject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the sub-
ject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention
was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976).
144. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584
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were part of a "useful process,"1 5 as required for subject matter quali-
fication. But if the process contained a program described as consisting
of a mathematical formula or algorithm, it was considered a law of
nature, and therefore not patentable.14 6 "The rule that the discovery of
a law of nature cannot be patented rests, not on the notion that natural
phenomena are not processes, but rather on the more fundamental un-
derstanding that they are not the kind of 'discoveries' that the statute
was enacted to protect. 4 7 However, in the 1981 case of Diamond v.
Diehr,1 48 the Supreme Court saw the program in question as part of an
industrial process, and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical
formula. As a result, processes will now not automatically be precluded
from being considered as patentable subject matter due to the inclusion
of an unpatentable algorithm.4 9
While one author hailed the decision as "the end of some twelve
years of litigation concerning the patentability of computer pro-
grams,"15 0 there are no clear-cut guidelines on exactly what will pass
muster. In fact, the language used in drafting a patent claim may make
a difference as to the final determination:
[A]ssuming that the claims do define a mathematical algorithm, if
the implementation of the algorithm is couched in terms which ei-
ther define the structural relationship between physical elements in
a claimed apparatus or refine or limit steps in the process for which
the patent is being sought, the claim will probably be patentable. 151
(1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
145. See supra text accompanying notes 139 and 140.
146. Parker, 437 U.S. at 593.
147. Id. "[A] scientific principle, such as that expressed in respondent's al-
gorithm, reveals a relationship that has always existed." Id. at 593, n.15. The court
notes one author's analogy to the fact that the law of gravity existed even before
Newton's formulation of the law. That the law has been recognized affords no rights to
exclude others from its use. "Patentable subject matter must be new (novel); not
merely heretofore unknown." Id., quoting P. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMEN-
TALS 13 (1975). The courts typically exclude scientific principles, laws of nature, ideas
and mental processes. In Re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 794 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
148. 450 U.S. 175 (1981). For a number of articles discussing this case and
those leading up to the decision, see section D of the bibliography accompanying this
note.
149. Note, Algorithm Patentability after Diamond v. Diehr, 15 IND. L. REV.
713, 732 (1982).
150. Legal Times of Washington, May 4, 1981, at 27, col. 1, 28, col. 4.
151. Rose, Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in Computers and Com-
puter Programs: Recent Developments, 9 IEPP miN L. REV. 547, 557 (1982). Rose
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In a paper presented at the Second Annual Software Protection Con-
ference in 1981, one author suggested that "the distinction the Su-
preme Court has attempted to draw between patentable processes and
mathematical algorithms is confusing and unnecessary,"'1 2 as well as
"illogical and artificial." 153 The suggestion is that the statutory require-
ments be applied to algorithms as with any other item sought to be
patented.
The discussion on algorithms was continued by the Delaware dis-
trict court in the 1983 case of Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v.
Merrill-Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.lM The court began with the pre-
mise that computer programs are patentable, but that they must meet
the same statutory requirements as do other inventions. A fair portion
of the opinion on the issue discussed the confusion caused by the lack
of a standard, acceptable definition of the term "algorithm." The court
ultimately accepted a narrow definition so as to enable the claim
presented to constitute a methodology, and not a restatement of a
mathematical formula. 5 While the court determined that the process
involved constituted patentable subject matter, it is clear that congres-
sional action is needed for uniformity.
Patent protection is ideal if the program qualifies. One drawback,
however, is that the application procedure is lengthy,156 which can de-
lay the entry of a product into the market. Trade secret protection can
be used until a patent application ig approved in two or three years, but
the extent of protection, as seen, is not as comprehensive as that pro-
vided by a patent.
is discussing a two-step test for patentability outlined by the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A. 1978) and In Re Walter, 618 F.2d 758 (C.C.P.A. 1980). On
October 1, 1982, after 53 years of existence, the C.C.P.A. joined with the U.S. Court
of Claims to become the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (C.A.F.C.).
Milde, Life after Diamond v. Diehr: The CCPA Speaks Out on the Patentability of
Computer-Related Subject Matter, 64 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 434, 434 (1982).
152. Gemignani, Should Algorithms be Patentable?, 22 JURIMErRICS J. 326, 334
(1982).
153. Id. at 335.
154. 564 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Del. 1983).
155. Id. at 1368.
156. A patent was issued for a system of computer programs for retrieving data
and producing reports on stocks and bonds ten years after the application was made.
The delay was due to the confusion on rules governing patent protection for computer
programs. N.Y. Times, June 12, 1982, at 44, col. 1. In another case, an issue of statu-
tory qualification was finally 'decided in favor of the claimant twelve years after his
application was filed. In Re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912 (1982).
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The essential thing to remember, when considering the viability of
patenting a computer program, is that the program as a process must
be entirely new. The flow chart designed must be entirely novel, and
the overall process must be non-obvious.
V. Conclusion
It is clear that computer programs constitute proprietary informa-
tion deserving of legal protection. Until congressional action is taken,
designating an all-encompassing form of protection to adequately safe-
guard software owners' rights, the public must rely upon the present
systems. While the courts and legislature are slowly molding the law to
accommodate our rapidly-changing, computer-permeated lifestyle, ex-
pertise is needed to determine which avenue best serves a client's needs.
While the general legal practitioner should be familiar with the availa-
ble means of protection for computer software, it is recommended that
advice be sought from an experienced patent attorney who has dealt
extensively with the subject matter.
New technological developments will undoubtedly uncover issues
not conceived of only a short time ago. As a result, some important and
exciting changes will be witnessed as software developers seek legal
protection for their creativity, which is in ever-increasing demand.
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